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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
EXHIBIT ONE WAS A BEGINNING POINT OF NEGOTIATION AND WAS NOT 
ACCEPTED BY EITHER PARTY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS IN ANY WAY 
BINDING ON EITHER PARTY. 
Mrs, Sn Itchier places great weight on the initial unsigned 
stipulation presented to her, which is represented by exhibit one. 
Mr, Montgomery never proposed ** and did not sign I t. Its sole 
purpose v- , ; egotiation. Mr. Montgomery J"s 
proposal was the executed stipulation ultimately agreed to by the 
parties and approved by the court, At best the initial document is 
•* pari uf negotiations And therefore should be given no weight. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF MISINTERPRETS THE GATES-MYERS-DE SPAIN LINE OF CASES. 
Mi : ' • - • relies exclusive] y on the authority of Gates v 
Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990). Gates, stands for the 
proposition that a party cannot claim the benefit of asking for a 
finding of "no change of circumstances' when the reason there is no 
change is that he previously misrepresented his income. The court 
has consistently treated differently those issues that were subject 
to the equitable powers of the court and those that were propei: ty 
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agreements and susceptible to contract principles. 
The Court of Appeals in Gates, specifically quoted with 
approval the distinctions made in Myers v Myers, 768 P. 2d 979 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
In Myers, this court noted that while contract theories 
such as bargain and waiver are properly applied to a stipulation as 
to property-distribution, such theories are inapplicable to issues 
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court, such 
as child custody and support. 
In Myers, the Court of Appeals was critical of the defendant 
for trying to make the distinction Mrs. Snitchler wants the court 
to make in the present case. 
In Despain, the Utah Supreme Court stated that, 
[d]efendant has failed to observe the distinction between those 
cases involving the statutory power of a court in a divorce 
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases in 
which parties in a divorce action have settled their property 
rights by agreement, the terms of which are incorporated in a 
decree. (Myers; 
In Despain v Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), the Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion that parties to a divorce could 
bargain for property settlements that were beyond the power of the 
court to impose because they were a part of the quid pro quo of a 
divorce settlement and subject to contract law principles. 
A husband, who has undertaken an obligation in consideration 
of the provisions of the property settlement agreement which were 
for his benefit cannot subsequently complain that the court, in the 
absence of such agreement would have been without power to order 
him to do so. (Despain) 
The court affirmed the right of parties to bargain their 
property rights as may seem to them in their individual best 
interest. 
3 
Mrs. Snitchler wrongly interprets the meaning of the "Woodward 
Formula". Woodward v Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) and all of 
its progeny stand for the proposition that pension and retirement 
benefits are marital assets susceptible of division as part of the 
property settlement. Appellee acknowledges in her brief that to 
obtain her relief the court must reinterpret and create "an 
additional exception" to the established case law. 
POINT THREE 
MRS. SNITCHLER MADE AN INTELLIGENT DECISION TO MODIFY THE DECREE 
BASED UPON HER OWN INVESTIGATION AND COUNSEL. 
The simple fact is there was no misrepresentation of any kind 
by Mr. Montgomery. He did not even speak to Mrs. Snitchler for 
more than a year before the stipulation was executed. His counsel 
never even spoke with Mrs. Montgomery. All negotiations were 
conducted between attorney's. If there was a mistake taking place 
in Mrs. Snitchler's interpretation of what could happen, Mr. 
Montgomery had no way of knowing about it. However there was no 
mistake. 
Montgomery gave her the proposed stipulation as an option in 
straight forward plain language. Either waive the monthly 
retirement payment and take a percentage of the lump sum or wait 
years for him to build up enough additional retirement benefits to 
meet her $400.00 per month demand. In consideration of her health 
and the health of Mr. Montgomery her decision to execute the 
stipulation was a reasonable one. In an aging, frail, remarried 
individual an immediate lump sum may be preferable to an income 
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stream ten years in the future. 
The stipulation and subsequent order are abundantly clear that 
she is waiving and giving up all claim to any monthly payment or 
annuity. The disclosure is as plain as language can make it. 
This is all the more poignant because she retired from Civil 
Service as well. This is not some obscure retirement planf this is 
government civil service. There are several offices in the Ogden 
area to answer any questions she or her counsel may have had. The 
document being signed by Mrs. Snitchler in October of 1989 was the 
standard government form. 
Her claim that it was some how hidden from her is ludicrous. 
She had already retired herself and filled out the same form. Even 
if she hadn't she could easily obtained the form from any of the 
local civil service offices. But even if there was shenanigans 
with the form, Civil Service required a new QDRO. The government 
document was not enough without a new QDRO to replace the existing 
one. 
The new QDRO required a new stipulation signed by the parties 
and counsel. Montgomery offered only one inducement to sign the 
stipulation. That was, his promise to retire now, if she waived 
the monthly payments, instead of in ten years. He told her if she 
insisted on the rights she had under the prior order, then he would 
work the next ten years to earn enough retirement benefits to pay 
her and still live on the income he wanted to. There was no way 
Montgomery could compel her. He could only propose the agreement 
and offer to retire early if she signed. It could only be done 
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with her consent to the stipulation. The court lacked authority to 
impose the agreement if the parties didn't stipulate. It could 
only be done by bargained for agreement. 
Montgomery lived up to his part of the bargain and retired. 
Mrs. Snitchler now wants to renege on her promise. Don't let her. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case in which Mrs. Snitchler was entitled to a 
portion of her exhusband's civil service retirement benefits per 
the divorce decree. The parties agreed to a modification of their 
property rights. The inducement for the modification was the 
waiver by Mrs. Snitchler of monthly payments. Mr. Montgomery in 
return agreed to retire early. Neither party could have compelled 
the other to do what they stipulated to do. The court lacked 
jurisdiction to alter the property provisions of the decree except 
as they bargained. 
The principles of bargain and exchange apply. No one 
seriously thinks there was any misrepresentation. There is 
absolutely no evidence of such. Mrs. Snitchler now wants more out 
of Montgomery now that he is retired. She is suffering from buyers 
remorse. At the time, her deal was an intelligent one considering 
the length of time before Montgomery would otherwise retire and the 
respective health of the parties. The trial court's modification 
should be overturned and the previous order honored. 
Dated this 14th day of July, 1992. 
Donald^C. Hughes 
Attorney for Defend&nt/Appellant 
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